This supplemental appendix proceeds in two parts. First, in the section immediately below, I discuss the measurement decisions and summary statistics for my primary variables; civil war duration, malaria prevalence and rebel strength. Following this discussion, I report and interpret a series of coefficient tables corresponding to the robustness models mentioned in the main paper's empirical section.
. I discuss each of these dichotomous indicators in turn, while providing additional theoretical justification for each component part vis-à-vis Hypothesis 2, which posited that high malaria prevalence will prolong civil wars only among civil wars involving weak rebel groups.
The first component part mentioned above is a dichotomous indicator of whether a rebel group "has a clear leadership structure and if the leadership exercises a high degree of control over the organization," under the premise that, relative to less centralized or more fragmented groups, centralized rebel groups will exhibit more control over forces, and hence will be better able to effectively target government actors (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009, 580) .
This feature fits nicely into my group-density based arguments with regards to malaria prevalence in that more centralized and less fragmented groups should exhibit more concentrated, rather than diffuse, fighting and deployment styles. Similarly, the second component part to rebel strength taps directly into the mobilization capacity of a given insurgency, in particular capturing whether a given rebel group exhibits high mobilization capacity (in terms of number of fighters) relative to government actors. Hence, the second component to rebel strength
provides an indicator of the current (and latent) number of available rebel fighters, which corresponds directly to the relationship between absolute group size, malaria transmission, and civil war, as outlined in the theoretical section of the main paper.
The third component part to rebel strength measures whether (or not) rebels have a high arms procurement capacity. Like centralized control, this serves as a proxy for the degree to which a given insurgent group practices diffuse, guerilla style fighting tactics, as opposed to military tactics that more closely match those utilized by government forces. Therefore, this component will allow me to further capture whether a given rebel group truly has advantages in terms of both group density, and phase 1 (as opposed to phase 2) level impacts on the natural environment surrounding rebel group bases and habitats. In addition, it is likely that this indicator (and those above) also captures, to a degree, the likelihood that a rebel group possesses the resources to rotate troops into and out of conflict zones, as opposed to remaining in conflict zones full time.
The final component part to rebel strength is a dichotomous measure of whether (or not) a rebel group has a "high" fighting capacity, in relation to government forces (Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009, 580) . As argued by Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009, 580-581 ) "groups with low fighting capacity should be less likely to try to challenge the government in direct armed confrontation and instead opt for hit and run attacks typical of guerrilla warfare." This measure therefore captures elements of rebel group density and size, the degree of (malarial) conflict zone habitation (under the assumption that groups with lower fighting capacity will have even lower incentives and abilities to travel outside of conflict zones), and the degree to which the socio-geographic features of a given conflict zone are conducive to rebels defensive capabilities (which is likely to be highly correlated with the practice of guerilla fighting tactics). Therefore, taken together, each of these four component parts captures an important dimension of rebel group weakness, and of rebel groups' incentives (and willingness) to pursue guerilla military tactics in civil war. As many of these very features, including group size and group density, were explicitly linked to the malaria burdens described in the main paper, I believe that rebel strength serves as a reasonable proxy for the dynamics underlying Hypothesis 2.
I next examine the aggregate summary statistics for my malaria prevalence and rebel strength variables. Table A .1 first presents the primary summary statistics for these two variables across my entire sample. As one can see, malaria prevalence is typically moderate to high for the countries and regions in my sample, although there is a high level of variation therein, whereas rebel groups typically exhibit low levels of rebel strength for my sample as a whole.
The histograms for these two variables are presented in Figure A .2 and provide a more nuanced picture of the above conclusions. Specifically, one can see here that the two most common rates of malaria for my sample are 0% (roughly 12% of all observations) and 100% (roughly 40% of all observations), with a moderate number of cases throughout this variable's entire range.
By comparison, slightly over 90% of all observations for rebel strength lie within "weak" rebel cases, with the remaining observations falling roughly equally across the higher two categories of rebel strength (i.e., "parity" and "strong"). , 1947-1970) , and civil conflicts heavily dominated by weak rebel groups thereafter (with the exception of an upswing in rebel strength during the mid 1990's). In sum, there appears to be a significant degree of variation in my variables not just across the countries in my sample, but also over my temporal range of analysis. As discussed in the main paper, my tests of Hypothesis 2 focus upon not only my malaria prevalence and rebel strength variables, but also upon their interaction (i.e., malariaXrebelstrength). Also recall that when evaluating the substantive effects of this interaction, I typically examine a 0-to-1 change in malaria prevalence at each respective level of rebel strength. To ensure that I have a sufficient number of observations at each of these intersections, I next generate a scatter plot of my malaria prevalence and rebel strength variables, jittering these plotted points for ease of interpretation. This scatter plot appears in Figure A .4 and indicates that while my observations for malaria prevalence are indeed sparser within the "parity" and "strong" rebel strength categories than for the "weak" categories, I do indeed have coverage and support across the entire range of these two variables, particularly for malaria prevalence's values of 0 and 1, which represent the two most common values on malaria prevalence for my sample, and also the values that I use to evaluate my Hypothesis 2 marginal effects. Hence, the observed variation derived from my interaction of malaria prevalence and rebel strength encompasses the entire range of values under examination, suggesting that the marginal effects and Hypothesis 2 tests presented in the main paper are indeed appropriate. 
Robustness Models
As mentioned earlier, I also reassess my empirical models under a wide number of alternative model specifications. For each of these robustness tests, and when applicable, I estimate the three main model specifications presented in Table 1 of the main paper (i.e. Models 1-3) and then assess the stability and statistical significance of each malaria prevalence coefficient estimate therein. The following section presents and summarizes these additional robustness models.
To begin, I re-evaluate my primary models when using a sample that includes all coup d'états as civil war cases, along with a control variable for these cases, demonstrating that my decisions with respect to coups have no effects on the significance levels for malaria prevalence (Table A. 2). The second robustness test evaluates my findings when an alternate control for a country/region's tropical location is used in place of percent tropic. I specifically employ the (natural log of the) latitude of a country's geographic centroid-a measure of tropical location that is relatively less sensitive to a country or region's total geographic size-and then reestimate each model specification with this alternate control. As indicated in Table A .3, I find in this case that doing so has no effect on the statistical significance of my findings vis-àvis malaria prevalence. Following extant civil war research (e.g., Mukherjee, 2006; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009 ), I next re-estimate my main results while addressing the potential for unit (i.e., conflict dyad) level heterogeneity in my data with a multiplicative unit specific frailty term (estimated via random effects), rather than with clustered standard errors. I find in this case (Table A .4) that my malaria prevalence results remain robust to the inclusion of a unit-specific frailty term.
As alluded to in the main paper, my next robustness test further assesses whether my findings for malaria prevalence and civil war duration are arising due to omitted variable bias with particular regard to state capacity. Low state capacity could cause both high malaria prevalence and lengthy civil wars, and while several of my primary controls (such as democracy and ln GDP per capita) have been used as measures of state capacity in past civil conflict research (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003) , other scholars have called these operationalizations into question (Hendrix, 2010) . Hence Table A .5 takes these concerns into account by additionally controlling for three of the most direct and verifiable measures of state capacity, as argued by Hendrix (2010 Hendrix ( , 2011 : bureaucratic quality, 1 ln military expenditure, 2 and taxes/GDP. 3 Given limitations in temporal coverage for these measures, my resultant sample in Table A .5 corresponds to only civil wars beginning during the post-1983 period, which also forces me to omit war on core territory from these survival model specifications as it has no variation during this period. These challenges notwithstanding, my findings for malaria prevalence remain negative and highly significant across all three specifications in Table A .5, suggesting that malaria has a prolonging effect on civil war duration that is independent to state capacity.
Malaria is but one of the many tropical diseases that affect human morbidity and mortality.
Moreover, many non-malarial diseases often co-occur with malaria across regions and time,
and several-such as yellow and dengue fever-may similarly contribute to social strife (Letendre, Fincher and Thornhill, 2010). As such, the findings presented above do not rule out the possibility that these secondary diseases (i) have a comparable effect to that of malaria on civil war duration and (ii) potentially lead me to falsely conclude a significant effect of malaria prevalence when in fact it is these secondary diseases that are truly driving my results. Hence, verifying whether my core findings are attributable to omitted (disease) variable bias is critical.
Drawing on the same sources and coding scheme discussed for malaria prevalence in the main paper, I accordingly construct two comparable geographic disease prevalence measures for yellow and dengue fever, 4 and include them as control variables in the models reported in Table   A .6. This table indicates that my findings for malaria prevalence are highly robust to the inclusion of these controls. Moreover, the coefficient estimates for dengue fever are negative and marginally statistically significant across several of the models in Table A .6 (though those for yellow fever are not), thereby implying that dengue fever may have a similar conflict-prolonging effect to that of malaria prevalence.
There have been a number of global trends in malaria over the past half century, including what has been described in recent decades as a "rapidly increasing disease burden" that is generally attributed to population shifts and climate shocks (Sachs and Malaney, 2002, 680) .
To ensure that my findings are not simply an artifact of these temporal dynamics, I next re-ran my three primary models while including year fixed effects in each. As indicator in place of the democracy indicator described above. These alternate specifications appear in Table A .9 below and confirm that malaria prevalence remains a significant predictor of civil war duration even after including this alternate operationalization of democracy.
While the operationalization of malaria prevalence described in the main paper emphasizes the temporal precedence of malaria prevalence vis-à-vis civil war (and its duration), an assessment of the more instantaneous effects of malaria prevalence on civil war duration-while potentially more endogenous-has significant policy relevance. Indeed, assessing the effects of malaria in year t on a civil war's probability of ending in that same year can give policymakers (i) a real time prediction of a civil war's likelihood of immediate termination, given current malaria levels, and (ii) a sense of whether a reduction in current malaria prevalence levels can be expected to yield an increased likelihood of peace. I therefore create a second measure of malaria prevalence where I interpolate the CID's 1946 CID's , 1966 CID's , 1982 CID's , and 1994 to the yearly level such that any given year now corresponds to the most proximate year of CID malaria prevalence observance (forward or backwards, and thus including all civil wars occurring in 1945 and 1946). Re-running my models with these interpolated results yields two key insights. First, and in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, this interpolated malaria prevalence measure is negative and significant (p < .05) across all three models (Table A. 10) . Second, the instantaneous effects of malaria prevalence on civil war duration are even stronger than the lagged effects identified above.
For the next three robustness model specifications, I verify that my primary results hold under three alternative (parametric) survival model estimators that have been employed in past civil war studies (e.g., Hegre et al., 2001; de Rouen and Sobek, 2004; Buhaug, Gates and Lujala, 2009 (2009), which include variables such as a conflict's location on a border, a conflict zone's distance from a country's capital city (and the interaction of this measure with border), the presence of gemstones, drugs, or petroleum in the conflict zone, and the percentage of a conflict zone corresponding to mountainous and forest terrain. One notable challenge in incorporating these covariates into a test of my hypotheses is that these data are at the conflict-dyad level, rather than the more disaggregated rebel group conflict-dyad level. This ensures that Buhaug, Gates and Lujala's georeferenced conflict measures are at a higher level of aggregation than the units analyzed above (and in, e.g., Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) ). Attempts to reconcile these differences yielded a substantial number of non-matching cases (though an analysis using those cases that did perfectly match supported the above conclusions . I find that malaria prevalence continues to exert a highly significant prolonging effect on civil war across 9 of these 10 robustness models, wherein for the one case where malaria prevalence did not achieve traditional significance it nevertheless remained significant at the p < .12 level. Hence my findings for malaria prevalence appear to be robust to the inclusion of this broader set of geo-located civil war correlates. (2009) 
